Trends. Ehud Barak and Peace: Mistakes on the 15-Month Mistake by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 7 Issue 3 Article 3 
7-23-1999 
Trends. Ehud Barak and Peace: Mistakes on the 15-Month 
Mistake 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the International Relations Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Other 
Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (1999) "Trends. Ehud Barak and Peace: Mistakes on the 15-Month Mistake," International Bulletin of 
Political Psychology: Vol. 7 : Iss. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol7/iss3/3 
This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology 
1 
 
Title: Trends. Ehud Barak and Peace: Mistakes on the 15-Month Mistake 
Author: Editor  
Volume: 7 
Issue: 3 
Date: 1999-07-23 
Keywords: Israel, Lebanon, Middle East, Palestine, Peace Negotiations, Security, Syria 
 
Many analysts, journalists, and diplomats--the last often speaking on an unattributed basis--have been 
citing a huge error in the current quest for peace between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority 
and between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. (Some rather view the peace quest as among the four 
entities given their de facto independence, even if Lebanon largely functions as a dependent surrogate 
or vassal of Syria.) The huge error supposedly is Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's declaration that 
important agreements on the peace quest must be finalized, or be close to finalization, within 15 
months. 
 
There are at least two significant rationales for viewing the declaration as error. First, a deadline allows 
negotiating powers to not even attempt serious negotiation until the deadline is drawing nigh. Second, 
the deadline becomes a tripwire of failure for its declarer--leading to pressures to accept positions not in 
the interest of security but of not failing to reach an agreement. 
 
In opposition to opponents of deadline, one might well posit that a deadline impedes a negotiating 
power from merely stringing others along and marking time. A deadline--through the setting down of a 
marker--also can demonstrate the resolve and good faith of the deadline's creator and facilitate 
negotiation. 
 
In fact, a history of peace negotiations among various nation-states and political entities surely suggests 
that deadlines may or may not contribute to successful resolution of Issues. As with decisions on clarity 
and ambiguity on how specific Issues are even conceptualized and phrased, a general stance on always 
favoring or opposing deadlines becomes yet another set of ideological blinders with which negotiating 
participants are already burdened and from which they must try to break free. 
 
The correct stance on the 15-month deadline is to recognize the threats and opportunities it entails and 
then to proceed towards the peace of the brave. (See Druckman, D. (1997). Dimensions of international 
negotiations: Structures, processes, and outcomes. Group Decision and Negotiation, 6, 395-420; 
National security policy and toleration for ambiguity: Israel, Northern Ireland, North Korea, and the 
World. (September 4, 1998). IBPP, 5(10); Ghosh, D. (1996). Nonstrategic delay in bargaining: An 
experimental investigation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 67, 312-325; Ochs, 
E., & Jacoby, S. (1997). Down to the wire: The cultural clock of physicists and the discourse of consensus. 
Language in Society, 26, 479-505; The deployment of ground forces to Kosovo: A paean for ambiguity. 
(February 5, 1999). IBPP, 6(5); Safire, W. (July 22, 1999). The cherubic commando. The New York Times, 
p. A21.) (Keywords: Israel, Lebanon, Middle East, Palestine, Peace Negotiations, Security, Syria.) 
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